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MARYLAND'S DIMINISHED LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
IN THE WAKE OF ZAVIANv. FOUDY
Jeffrey J. Utermohlet
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Zavian v. Foudy, 1 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland embraced an ultraconservative approach to extraterritorial personal jurisdiction in suits between agent and principal. 2 Specifically, the court
adopted a rule that an agent's acts in Maryland are attributed to her
nonresident principal whom a third party sues, 3 but such acts are not
so attributed if the agent sues the principal. 4 According to the court,
when an agent sues her out-of-state principal, the agent's in-state acts
do not count towards satisfYing the Maryland long-arm statute's "transacting business" pron~ or establishing the necessary due process6

t B.S., 1984, Journalism, University of Maryland at College Park; J.D., 1987,

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

University of Baltimore School of Law. Law Clerk to the Honorable Harry
A. Cole, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1987-1989; Adjunct Professor, Legal
Writing Program, University of Baltimore School of Law; Member, Law
Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C.
130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000).
See id. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770; see generally Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355
Md. 488,503-05, 517-20, 735 A.2d 1039, 1047-48, 1055-56 (1999) (providing
an excellent discussion of "principal-agent relationships, such as between
an attorney and his or her client"); accord Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 43536 (1991) (noting that "the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relationship"). But see Perlman v. Martin, 332 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (declining to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident client in attorney's suit for
fees because "a lawyer is an independent contractor and not his client's
agent in any general sense").
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has shown no reluctance to attribute an
agent's acts in Maryland to her nonresident principal whom a third party
sues. See Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 659, 370 A.2d 551, 554 ( 1977)
(sustaining jurisdiction where Kentucky defendant's agents, Maryland attorneys, engaged in six weeks of debt collection negotiations with the plaintiffin Maryland); Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 256 Md. 185, 196-97, 260 A.2d
22, 28 (1969) (upholdingjurisdiction over a New York real estate developer
that sent its "officers and agents" to Maryland to scout for locations, apply
for a building permit, negotiate an easement, and arrange for the installation of storm drains); Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 357, 231
A.2d 22, 26 (1967) (sustainingjurisdiction over a California-based racetrack
sponsor that sent its regularly employed agent into Maryland on five occasions to inspect and safety-certify the racetrack where the injuries
occurred).
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770.
Maryland's long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part: "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or fry an agent. (1)
Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the
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"minimum contacts.'' 7 This article posits that the Zavian court went
astray in following New York's Nonattribution Rule 8 and dismissing a
Maryland attorney's action against her nonresident clients for unpaid
legal fees.
In Zavian, a case of first impression, 9 Maryland's intermediate appellate court considered whether the Maryland contacts of three nonresident professional soccer players justified exercise of long-arm
personal jurisdiction. In the attorney's suit for unpaid legal fees, the
soccer player's contacts included retaining a Maryland attorney's services and making repeated business-related appearances in Maryland.10 The three clients, who were star members of the United States
Women's National Soccer Team and domiciled in different states, 11
initiated contact with the plaintiff, Maryland lawyer Ellen Zavian, in
late Summer 1996, 12 and asked her to become their agent. 13 Each
player signed a Personal Management Agreement under which Ms.
Zavian acted as their exclusive agent to negotiate footwear endorsement deals 14 and provide ancillary legal services. 15 All communications between Zavian and her clients were by telephone, fax, or mail. 16
During the subsequent nine months, Zavian, from her law office in
Columbia, Maryland, successfully negotiated lucrative 17 endorsement
contracts for Foudy, Overbeck, and Lilly with companies including

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

State." Mo. CoDE ANN., CTs. & Juo. PROc. § 6-103(b) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). In 1964, the Maryland legislature enacted the long-ann statute to ensure a "comprehensive expansion of the judicial jurisdiction of the
State of Maryland." Groom v. Margolis, 257 Md. 691, 702, 265 A.2d 249,
254 (1970). The "transacting business" prong was modeled after section
l.03(a)(1) of the 1962 Uniform Interstate and International Procedures
Act. /d. The drafters of the Uniform Act intended that the "transacting
business" prong be given an "expansive interpretation." UN1F. INTERSTATE
& INT'L PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03 cmt. at 362, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986).
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ l.
See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 693, 747 A.2d at 767.
/d. at 692-702, 747 A.2d at 766-72. See infra note 195 and accompanying
text.
Julie Foudy lived in California, Carla Overbeck lived in North Carolina, and
Kristine Lilly lived in Connecticut. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691-92, 747
A.2d at 765-66.
Brief for Appellant at 4, 7 & 10, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747
A.2d 764 (2000) (No. 00074). Julie Foudy, on behalf of her teammates,
had previously retained Ellen Zavian in 1995 for representation in a labor
dispute. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 765-66.
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766.

13.
14. /d.
15. Brief for Appellant at 6, 8, & 11; Record Extract at 24-28, 46-59, & 81-126,
Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000) (No. 00074).
16. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766.
17. Record at 8-23, 33-45, 63-80.
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Reebok, Fila, and Adidas, 18 and the players sent legal fee payments to
Zavian' s office in Maryland. 19 In July 1997, Zavian terminated each
Personal Management Agreement in order to devote her attention to
solely representing the United States Women's National Soccer
Team. 20 Zavian sent final bills to the three clients, but after each refused to pay21 she filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County. 22 The trial court granted the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
based on lack of personal jurisdiction,23 and Zavian appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 24 In holding that the soccer
players' attorney-client relationship with a Maryland lawyer, together
with their repeated business-related appearances in Maryland, did not
subject them to long-arm jurisdiction, the Zavian court adopted New
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. In federal practice, lack of personal jurisdiction will not always lead to
dismissal of the action; instead of dismissal, the court may transfer the case
to a forum where jurisdiction lies. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Servidone Constr. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1496, 1508 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding
that a federal court has the power to transfer an action "notwithstanding
that it lacks personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants"). Transfer
may save a plaintiff's cause of action otherwise time-barred by limitations in
the alternative forum. See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465
(1962) (observing that dismissal would have resulted in the loss of a substantial part of the cause of action). However, a court generally will not
transfer a case if it finds that the plaintiff's attorney "could have reasonably
foreseen when they brought their claims that the Maryland district court
lacked personal jurisdiction." Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195,
1202 (4th Cir. 1993).
24. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766. The Zavian court considered
whether the nonresident defendants had sufficient contacts with Maryland
to warrant an exercise of "specific" jurisdiction. !d. at 694, 747 A.2d at 767.
"Specific jurisdiction," which requires that the defendant have "minimum
contacts" with the forum, is exercisable over a nonresident when the suit
arises out of or relates to the contacts; "general jurisdiction," which requires that the defendant have "continuous and systematic" contacts with
the forum, is exercisable over a nonresident when the suit does not arise
out of or relate to the defendant's contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984); see also Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 422-23, 540 A.2d 482, 486-87 (1988)
(discussing "general jurisdiction"). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
stated in Presbyterian University Hospital v. Wilson:
[W]here a defendant may not have sufficient contacts to support
general jurisdiction, a trial judge need not segregate factors tending to support general jurisdiction from those supporting specific
jurisdiction. Rather, the court may utilize factors relevant to general jurisdiction in making a determination regarding the propriety
of the forum's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.
337 Md. 541, 551 n.2, 654 A.2d 1324, 1330 n.2 (1995).

4
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York's "Nonattribution Rule" 25 and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the lawsuit. 26
Part II of this Article traces the history of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and explains how most states' long-arm statutes, including
Maryland's, seek to extend personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due process. 27 Part III details the strong criticism
that New York's Nonattribution Rule has received from courts and
commentators. 28 It posits that the Zavian court went astray in adopting the Nonattribution Rule because the court did not appreciate the
fundamental difference between Maryland's and New York's long-arm
statutes: New York's ultraconservative approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction clashes with Maryland's historical commitment to extend its
personal jurisdiction to the outermost constitutionallimits. 29 Part III
also discusses the flawed underpinnings of the Nonattribution Rule
and describes why the cases used to justifY the Rule form a poor foundation for a doctrine turning on agency-based distinctions. 30 Part IV
analyzes why, contrary to Zavian's holding, the facts warranted exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under Maryland's long-arm statute
and the analytical roadmap of International Shoe and its progeny. 31
This Article concludes by calling on the Court of Appeals of Maryland
to resolve the conflict between the Maryland federal district court's
rejection of the Nonattribution Rule and the Maryland intermediate
appellate court's embrace of the Rule. 32
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURSIDICTION LAW

A.

Pennoyer v. Neff

The United States Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence originated in the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff. 33 According
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770.
Id. at 702, 747 A.2d at 772.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennayer, both parties claimed title to a piece of real
estate in Oregon. Id. at 719. Pennoyer asserted title under a sheriffs deed
resulting from the sheriff's sale of tlle property to Pennoyer to collect on a
judgment entered in Oregon against Neff, a nonresident of Oregon, in
favor of Neffs former attorney, Mitchell, for legal fees Neff owed. I d. The
Supreme Court determined that Mitchell's judgment was invalid and,
therefore, Pennoyer obtained no title by the sheriff's unauthorized sale of
the property because in the underlying action of Mitchell v. Neff, Neff had
not been personally served with process within Oregon; rather, the Oregon
court had asserted personal jurisdiction over the nonresident based merely
on constructive service by publication in Oregon. Id. at 719-20, 734. The
Pennayer Court reasoned that service by publication would, in the great majority of cases, never be seen by a nonresident defendant, and that
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to Pennoyer, " [t] he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted
by the territorial limits ofthe State in which it is established." 34 Therefore, the Court laid down principles that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory" 35 and, conversely, "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons and property without its territory. "36
The Pennoyer decision served another key function as it placed in personam jurisdictional analysis squarely under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 37 and provided support for
the Court's subsequent declaration that jurisdiction based on "physical presence" ipso facto satisfies due process. 38 Mter Pennoyer, interstate commerce-promoting innovations in transportation and
communication created a vastly different world, and the Supreme
Court responded to those changes in the granddaddy of all modern
personal jurisdiction cases, International Shoe v. Washington. 39

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

"(j]udgments for all sorts of claims upon contracts and for torts, real or
pretended" could thus fraudulently be obtained in ex parte proceedings
against nonresidents. Id. at 726. To assure "proper protection to citizens of
other States," the Court held that due process required that a court could
obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only by personal service of
process within the forum state, or by his voluntary appearance. Id. at 726,
733. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court o[Califomia, 495 U.S. 604 (1990),
in which the Supreme Court upheld "tag' jurisdiction over a nonresident
individual solely because he was served with process while visiting in the
forum state. Id. at 619.
Pennayer, 95 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 722.
I d.
Id. at 733; see also supra note 6.
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. However, the Supreme Court cautioned, "[i]t
goes too far to say ... that a State lacks jurisdiction over an individual
unless the litigation arises out of his activities in the State." Id. at 620.
326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld
Washington's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a Missouri-based
shoe company sued by the State of Washington for contributions owed to
that State's unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 320-21. The debt
arose from the in-state presence of eleven to thirteen of the company's
salesmen, each of whom operated under the direct supervision and control
of managers at the home office in Missouri. Id. at 313. By virtue of their
Washington sales activities, the Court noted that the shoe company had
"received the benefits and protections of the laws of the state, including the
right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights." Id. at 320.
Reciprocally, conducting such in-state activities "may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the [defendant] to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be
said to be undue." I d. at 319. In essence, the International Shoe Court recognized a quid pro quo whereby a nonresident subjects itself to personal jurisdiction in exchange for the privilege of conducting in-state activities,
provided the cause of action arises from those activities. Id. at 319-20.
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International Shoe v. Washington

In recognizing the diminishing utility of "physical presence," the
International Shoe Court formulated a completely new, and greatly expanded, test for constitutionally permissible extraterritorial jurisdiction, requiring only that the nondomiciliary have "certain minimum
contacts" 40 with a forum such that exercising jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 41
To take advantage of International Shoe's expanded constitutional
concept of in personam jurisdiction, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia enacted long-arm statutes42 enabling a court to hale a nonresident into the forum to defend a lawsuit. 43 For example, the longarm provision considered in Zavian provides, in pertinent part: "A
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or
by an agent . .. [t]ransacts any business or performs any character of
work or service in the State." 44 However, not all long-arm statutes are
created equal: the overwhelming majority of states, including Mary40. !d. at 316.
41. !d.
42. Although state laws, long-arm statutes may be relied on in federal court as
well as state court. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k).
43. See jAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE§ 108.60[1] (3d
ed. 1997) (defining "long-arm statute" as the exercise of "statutory jurisdiction over nonresident defendants").
44. Mo. ConE ANN., CTs. &Jun. PRoc. § 6-103(b) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). Maryland's long-arm statute, in its entirety, provides:
(a) Condition.-If jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon
this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from
any act enumerated in this section.
(b) In generaL-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who directly or by an agent: (1) Transacts any business or
performs any character of work or service in the State; (2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in
the State; (3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State; (4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside
of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly
does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of
conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods,
food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the
State; (5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the
State; or (6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any
person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located,
executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
(c) Applicability to computer information and computer programs-(l)(i) In this subsection the following terms have the
meanings indicated. (ii) "Computerinformation" has the meaning
stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial Law Article. (iii) "Computer
program" has the meaning stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial
Law Article. (2) The provisions of this section apply to computer
information and computer programs in the same manner as they
apply to goods and services.
!d.
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land, extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
due process decisions of the Supreme Court. 45 On the other hand, a
small minority of states implement their long-arm authority more narrowly than due process allows. 46 For instance, New York clings to an
anachronistic approach 47 best described as "half-way between Pennoyer
and International Shoe." 48 The Nonattribution Rule epitomizes New
York's conservative approach. 49
III.

THE NONATTRIBUTION RULE

Courts and commentators from New York to Maryland have
strongly criticized the Nonattribution Rule's arbitrary dichotomy, and
no court has ever fashioned a rational basis to support it.

A.

Criticism of the Rule in New Yom and Maryland

In Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc., 50 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland summarized the Nonattribution
Rule, stating:
The New York courts permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has acted in the state
through an agent, when the nonresident is sued by a third
party. When it is the agent suing the nonresident, those
courts will not attribute the agent's in-state acts to the nonresident, even if a classic agency relationship is involved. 5 1
From the courts of New York to those of Maryland, the Nonattribution Rule has sustained potent criticism. In Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 5 2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disparaged the
Nonattribution Rule's dichotomy, whereby an agent's in-state activities
are imputed to his nonresident principal whom a third party sues, 53
but such activities are not so imputed if the agent sues the principal:
45. See infra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Camelback Ski Corp. v.
Behning, 307 Md. 270, 274, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (1986) (describing the legislative purpose behind enactment of Maryland's long-arm statute as "the expansion of judicial jurisdiction up to but not beyond the outermost limits
permitted in this area by the due process decisions of the Supreme Court").
46. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
47. See generally Ingraham v. Carroll, 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1299-300 (N.Y. 1997)
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (decrying New York's "rigid" approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction as "not reflect[ing] a progressive reassessment as to
where the law is or ought to be, based on this flexible springboard of longarm jurisdiction").
48. Recent Decision, jurisdiction-In Personam Over Non-Domiciliaries-Transacting Business Within the State Under 302(a)(l), 34 BROOK. L. REv. 148, 152
(1968); see also infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
49. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001).
50. 521 F. Supp. 130 (D. Md. 1981).
51. Id. at 141.
52. 504 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 1065 n.l.
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"Conceptually, it would not seem to be a supportable distinction and
this is so noted by Dean McLaughlin." 54 Joseph McLaughlin, then
Dean of Fordham Law School and an acknowledged "outstanding authority"55 on New York procedural law, characterized the adoption of
the Nonattribution Rule as "a regrettable turn in the tortuous road" of
New York's long-arm statute. 56 The scholar cogently reasoned:
If the acts of a true agent may be imputed to his foreign principal when the suit is between a third party, who dealt with
the agent, and the principal, there is no analytical reason
why the acts of the agent cannot similarly be attributed when
the suit is between the agent and the principal. 57
Although some jurists in New York have followed the Nonattribution Rule, 58 other courts in New York and other jurisdictions have
not. 59 For example, in Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc., 60 Maryland's
54. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553
F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the Nonattribution Rule has received "strong criticism").
55. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 335 N.Y.S.2d llO, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
56. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974) (referring to the Practice
Commentaries by Joseph M. McLaughlin in the Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Stein v. Microelectronic Packaging, Inc., 98 Civ. 8952 (MBM), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11375, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.July 21, 1999). "[I]n a suit between
an agent and his out-of-state principal, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant-principal based on the plaintiff-agent's own activities
within the state." /d. (citations omitted).
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 60, 242 and
accompanying text. Although the Zavian opinion did not mention it,
courts sitting in New York often have asserted jurisdiction over an out-ofstate client sued by a New York lawyer for legal fees, provided the nonresident has visited the lawyer or substantially participated in the activities of
the lawyer in New York. See Fly, Shuebruk, Gaguine, Boros & Braun v. Marcus, 94 Civ. 543 (KTD), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
1996) (upholding NewYork's long-arm where NewYork law firm's contract
to provide legal services to the nonresident defendant "was entered into
and largely performed in New York and [ ] the defendant repeatedly met
with the plaintiff in New York"); Carro, Span bock, Kaster, & Cuiffo v. Rinzler, No. 88 Civ. 5280 (MJL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1212, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 1991) (upholding jurisdiction based on "the defendants' act of retaining a New York law firm to defend it in a suit in New York"); Reiner v.
Durand, 602 F. Supp. 849, 851-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sustaining jurisdiction
based on defendant's "various visits to and communications with the attorneys in New York" and also noting, "New York courts are divided over the
question of whether the retainer of an attorney in New York by an out of
state party is a transaction of business within the state so that jurisdiction
can be exercised over the non-resident"); Jecies v. Matsuda, 503 F. Supp.
580, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction in suit for unpaid legal
fees because cause of action arose out of defendants' alleged retainer of
plaintiff at plaintiff's New York law office); Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston
& Rosen, P.C. v. Shreve City Apartments, Ltd., 543 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (App.
Div. 1989) (sustaining jurisdiction based on defendants' retention of New
York law firm to provide representation in New York bankruptcy case, ex-
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federal court flatly rejected the Nonattribution Rule after noting that
the Second Circuit had also "questioned its soundness." 61 In Snyder, a
Maryland-based marketer of men's clothing solicited purchase orders
for many years from customer accounts in Maryland and other states
for clothing products of New York and North Carolina-based Hampton, from whom it received commission checks drawn on North Carolina and New York banks. 62 Eventually, Snyder sued Hampton for
breach of contract for failure to pay commissions. 63 In sustaining
long-arm jurisdiction over Hampton, the Maryland federal district
court held that "[c]ertain of the plaintiff's acts in Maryland can be
attributed to Hampton for jurisdictional purposes." 64 In doing so, the
court expressly repudiated New York's Nonattribution Rule. 65

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

tensive communications between the parties, and payments sent by defendants into New York); Elman v. Belson, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (App. Div.
1969) (sustaining jurisdiction over Illinois resident in action for attorney
fees because defendant's Illinois attorneys had come to New York to retain
New York attorneys to enforce Illinois judgments in New York, and subsequently made "several trips to New York, during which they participated in
the efforts" to collect on the judgments); see also Polish v. Threshold Tech.
Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (explaining that "plaintiff's
claim that he rendered legal services to the defendants in New York establishes a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction"); Mayer v. Goldhaber, 313 N .Y.S.2d
87, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (upholding jurisdiction because "[t]he retainer by
defendants of plaintiff for the purpose of legal representation in [New
York] is a purposeful transaction of business within [New York]"). But cf.
Amins v. Life Support Med. Equip. Co., 373 F. Supp. 654, 658 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (noting that despite isolated meetings between the parties in New
York, it was not "unreasonable or unfair" to deny a New York forum to a
New York attorney who had "sought out and accepted in Massachusetts employment by a small Massachusetts concern"). New York courts have generally denied jurisdiction where the nonresident client's only contacts with
New York have been activities performed there by his attorney. See Emmet,
Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105 (MGC), 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deeming services performed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for jurisdiction
where defendant did not come to New York to request plaintiff's legal services or undertake any other purposeful activity in New York); Haar v. Armendaris Corp., 294 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that services
performed by a nonresident attorney in New York, in the absence of in-state
acts by the client, are an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction in an action
for legal fees); Winick v.Jackson, 268 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (stating
that a nondomiciliary's hiring of a New York attorney for representation in
a New York legal proceeding does not constitute "doing business" in New
York).
521 F. Supp. 130 (D. Md. 1981).
/d. at 142 n.IO.
/d. at 133-36.
/d. at 133.
/d. at 141.
/d. at 141-42. The Snyder court observed that the Nonattribution Rule has
been criticized by New York commentators, see, for example, McLaughlin,
Practice Commentary, New York Civil Practice Law and Rule 302 (McKinney Supp. 1975), and is inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369
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In contrast to the well-reasoned criticism of the Nonattribution
Rule by the Second Circuit, Maryland's federal district court, and the
eminent New York scholar, Dean Joseph McLaughlin, no court or
commentator has yet advanced a rational basis to support the Nonattribution Rule's arbitrary dichotomy.

B.

Fundamental Differences in the Reach of the Long-Arm in New York and
Maryland

In addition to the Nonattribution Rule's status as a "regrettable" 66
doctrine supported by "no analytical reasoning," 67 another good reason for Maryland courts not to rely on New York precedent to support
a denial of long-arm jurisdiction is that Maryland, like forty-two other
states and the District of Columbia, extends its extraterritorial personal jurisdiction to the "full extent" authorized by the Due Process
Clause, 68 but New York, like a small minority of only six other states,
(D.C. 1978). Writing for the court in Rnse, Judge Ferren first distinguished
Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc.,
355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976), which held that the in-state acts of an "independent contractor" could not be attributed to the nonresident for jurisdictional purposes. Rnse, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C. 1978) (distinguishing
Envtl. Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808
(D.C. 1976)). Judge Ferren reasoned that due process would not permit
such attribution because "[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement
of a contact with the forum State." /d. (alteration in original) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In contrast, an agency relationship that contemplates some measure of control over the forum state
actor "results in 'the defendant's purposeful avail [ing] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state.'" /d. (alteration in original)
(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). The Snyder "court [found] Judge Ferren's reasoning in Rnse to be more persuasive than that employed by the
New York courts, and therefore decline[d] to follow the nonattribution
rule of Haar." Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 142.
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Maggos v. Helm, No. 9815751, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13244, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 1999) ("Hawaii's long-arm statute allows a court to assert in personam jurisdiction over
a defendant to the extent permitted by the due process clause."); Davis v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the Montana long-arm statute to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
maximum extent permitted by federal due process."); In re Celotex Corp. v.
Rapid Am. Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the West
Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due process ... "); Commercial Diving Servs. v. Vice, No-00-59-BH-C, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7671, at *3 (S.D. Ala. May 24, 2000) ("The Alabama Supreme Court
has interpreted Alabama's 'Long Arm Statute,' Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4.2, to extend the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts to the permissible limits of due process."); Omniken, Inc. v. Shepherd Tissue, Inc., No. 985269, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5268, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000) (stating that
a court applying Pennsylania's long-arm statute "may exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution"); Pkware, Inc. v.
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Meade, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (noting that the Wisconsin long-arm statute "is to be liberally construed in favor of exercising jurisdiction and is intended to confer jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due
process"); Afflerbach v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (D.
Wyo. 1998) (stating that the Wyoming long-arm statute "extends Wyoming
court's jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause"); Albertson's
Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Civ. No. 9Ml398-S-BLW, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554, at *7 (D. Idaho 1997) ("Because the Idaho long-arm
statute exercises all jurisdiction consistent with due process, the test becomes simply whether personal jurisdiction over the defendants comports
with due process."); Cramerv. Wade, 985 P.2d 467,471 (Alaska 1999) (stating that Alaska's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction "'to the maximum
extent permitted by due process under the federal constitution'"); DeMont
v. DeFrantz, No.2 CA-CVA 98-0038, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 163, at *5 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999) ("Rule 4.2(a) Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., authorizes
long-arm )urisdiction over a nonresident litigant to the maximum extent
allowed by the federal constitution."'); John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins,
962 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ark. 1998) (quoting ARK. ConE ANN. § 1&4-101 (B)
(Michie Supp. 1997): "The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.")); Stone v. Texas, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 657, 659 (Ct. App. 1999) ("California's long-arm statute permits
courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis not inconsistent with the federal or state constitutions."); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Equitas
Ltd., 987 P.2d 954, 957 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) ("In enacting the long-arm
statute, the General Assembly intended to extend the jurisdiction of Colorado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clauses of the
United States and Colorado Constitutions, pursuant to the minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe."); Friedman v. Alcatel Alsthom, 752
A.2d 544, 549 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Delaware courts have construed the longarm statute very broadly in order 'to confer jurisdiction to the maximum
extent possible under the Due Process Clause.'"); Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 325 (D.C. 2000) ("Congress intended the
District's long-arm statute, like the corresponding statutes in Maryland and
Virginia, to be coextensive in reach with the exercise of personal jurisdiction permitted by the due process clause."); Galindo v. Lanier Worldwide,
Inc., 526 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Bradlee Mgmt.
Servs. v. Cassells, 292 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. App. 1982) and stating that "the policy of [Georgia's] Long Arm Statute is to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due
process")); State ex rel. Miller v. Grodzinsky, 571 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1997)
("Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 provides for the broadest expanse of
personal jurisdiction consistent with due process."); St. Francis Mercantile
Equity Exch., Inc. v. Newton, 996 P.2d 365, 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("Kansas appellate courts have consistently found that the Kansas long-arm statute is to be liberally construed to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.");
Davis:Johnson v. Parmelee, 18 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that Kentucky's long-arm statute "permits the courts 'to reach to the full
constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.'"); Ruckstuhl v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 731
So. 2d 881, 885 (La. 1999) (stating that Louisiana's long-arm statute allows
"Louisiana courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent allowed by the United States Constitution");
Dorf v. Complastik Corp., 735 A.2d 984 (Me. 1999) ("By express language
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of the [Maine] long-arm statute, the courts must find personal jurisdiction
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution."); Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md. 112, 128
n.7, 617 A.2d 1057, 1064 n.7 (1993) ("As this Court has repeatedly stated,
the purpose of the Maryland Long Arm Statute is to permit a Maryland
court to exercise jurisdiction over the person to the full extent authorized
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553
(Mass. 1994) ("[T]he Massachusetts long-arm statute 'functions as "an assertion of jurisdiction over the person to the limits allowed by the Constitution of the United States."'"); Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813, 825 n.12
(Mich. 1997) ("'[The long-arm statute] was intended to give Michigan
courts the full extent of power possible to gain personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants as is consistent with the principles of due process."') (alteration in original) (quoting Kriko v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357
N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1984)); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d
670, 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the Minnesota long-arm statute "permits courts to assert jurisdiction over defendants to the extent that
federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow"); State ex rel.
K-Mart Corp. v. Bolliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Mo. 1999) ("This Court
has determined that the legislative intent of the Missouri General Assembly
in passing [the long-arm statute] 'was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state over nonresident defendants to the extent permissible under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of
the United States."'); Castle Rose, Inc. v. Phila. Bar & Grill of Ariz., Inc.,
576 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Neb. 1998) ("Nebraska's long-arm statute ... expressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation with Nebraska as far as the U.S.
Constitution permits . . . . "); Baker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 999 P.2d
1020, 1023 (Nev. 2000) ("Nevada's long-arm statute ... reaches the limits
of due process set by the United States Constitution."); South Down Recreation Ass'n v. Moran, 686 A.2d 314, 316 (N.H. 1996) ("[W]e construe our
statutes providing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 'to the full constitutional limit .... "'); F.F. v. G.A.D.R., 750 A.2d 786, 789 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (stating that New Jersey's "long arm jurisdictional rule is
coextensive with constitutional due process jurisdictional limits"); Tercero
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, 980 P.2d 77, 80 (N.M. Ct. App.
1999) (noting that New Mexico's long-arm "statute extends the jurisdictional reach of New Mexico courts as far as constitutionally permissible");
Saxon v. Smith, 479 S.E.2d 788, 794 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) ("Under [North
Carolina's] 'long arm' statute, North Carolina courts may obtain personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the full extent permitted by
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution."); Auction Effertz, Ltd. v. Schecher, 611 N.W.2d 173, 176 (N.D. 2000) (stating that
North Dakota's long-arm provision was "'designed to permit the state
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by
due process'") (quoting Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co.,
234 N.W.2d 250, 255 (N.D. 1975)); Ferrell v. Prairie Int'l Trucks, Inc., 935
P.2d 286, 288 (Okla. 1997) ("Oklahoma's long-arm statute extends the jurisdiction of its courts over non-residents to the outer-limits permitted by
the Oklahoma Constitution and the United States Constitution."); Sutherland v. Brennan, 901 P.2d 240,244-45 (Or. 1995) ("'[A]n Oregon court has
jurisdiction to the limits of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment;
those limits are "an issue of federal law to be decided pursuant to the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court."'"); Porter v. Porter,
684 A.2d 259, 261 (R.I. 1996) (Rhode Island's long-arm statute confers on
its courts ·~urisdiction over persons up to federal constitutional due process
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does not. 69 The limited reach of New York's long-arm statute renders
limits"); Meyer v. Paschal, 498 S.E.2d 635, 638 (S.C. 1998) ("South Carolina
enacted its version of the long-arm statute in 1966 and it has been interpreted to extend to the outer limits of the due process clause."); Vending v.
Kraft, 161 N.W.2d 29, 34 (S.D. 1968) (holding that South Dakota applies its
long-arm statute to the fullest extent permissible under due process); Mfrs.
Consolidation Serv. v. Rodell, 42 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that Tennessee's long-arm statute "authorizes the assertion of personal jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process"); CSR Ltd. v. Link,
925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (noting that the Texas long-arm statute
reaches "'as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process
will allow'") (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English
China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) ); Starways, Inc. v.
Curry, 980 P.2d 204, 206 (Utah 1999) ("[T]he Utah long-arm statute 'must
be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law.'"); Brown
v. Cal Dykstra Equip. Co., 740 A.2d 793, 794 (Vt. 1999) (stating that the
Vermont long-arm statute" 'reflects a clear policy to assert jurisdiction over
individual defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process
Clause"') (quoting N. Aircraft v. Reed, 572 A.2d 1382, 1385 (Vt. 1990));
Glumina Bank v. D.C. Diamond Corp., 527 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Va. 2000)
("'The function of [Virginia's] long-arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over
nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in Virginia, to the
extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the
United States.'") (quoting Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 337
S.E.2d 388, 391 (Va. 1989)); Nagy v. Williams, No. 23895-1-11, 1999 Wash.
App. LEXIS 2071, at *3-*4 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999) (stating that
Washington's long-arm statute "is meant to be coextensive with the limits of
federal due process").
69. New York is one of only seven jurisdictions (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Mississippi and New York) that do not interpret their longarm statute as extending to the full extent of constitutional authority. See
Anderson v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that New York's long-arm statute "'does not extend New York's
long-arm jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution'")
(quoting Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Med. Taping Sys., 10 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)); Thomason v. Chern. Bank, 661 A.2d
595,602 (Conn. 1995) ("If the legislature had meant to allow our courts to
exercise the full extent of constitutionally permissible long arm jurisdiction, it could have done so explicitly."); Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868,
869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("Generally speaking, Florida's long-arm statutes are of a class that requires more activities or contacts to allow service of
process than are currently required by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court."); Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1314 (Ill. 1990)
("Illinois' long-arm statute ... may well restrict the power that the courts of
this State have to bring nonresidents before them to a greater extent than
do the Federal due process clause and the 'minimum contacts' standard
developed over the years by the Supreme Court."). The Appellate Court of
Illinois has held that:
Illinois courts are not to consider only the literal meaning of the
text of the long-arm statute or the evolving federal constitutional
standards of due process; they must consider the constraints imposed by the Illinois Constitution's guarantee of due process ....
Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be asserted "only when it is fair,just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the
quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or
which affect interests located in Illinois." ... The focus is on the
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New York precedent denying jurisdiction inapposite in full-extent
states such as Maryland. As one commentator noted, jurisdictions mistakenly adopt New York precedent without taking note of the limitations of New York's law, specifically, that New York's jurisdictional
statute does not go to the limits of the Constitution, and that New
York law additionally requires the defendant's physical presence. 70
From this it follows that New York case law denying long-arm jurisdiction is readily distinguishable in any state, such as Maryland, whose
long-arm statute either goes to the constitutional limits or simply does
not require physical presence in the state. 71
The broad reach of Maryland's current long-arm law stands out in
comparison to a predecessor statute 72 that subjected foreign corporadefendant's activities within the forum state, not those of the
plaintiff.
Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen, 705 N.E.2d 121, 127 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998); see also Anthem Ins. Cos. Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d
1227, 1232 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting the proposition that the Indiana longarm statute was "intended to be coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause"); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234
F.3d 863, 869 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Mississippi's long-arm statute is not coextensive with due process."); Goldstein v. Christiansen, 638 N.E.2d 541,
545 n.1 (Ohio 1994) (noting that "Ohio has not extended long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of due process").
70. Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L.
REv. 565, 577-78 (1999).
71. !d.; see also infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing that Maryland's
long-arm statute does not require the defendant's physical presence in the
state); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing that Maryland's
long-arm statute extends to the "outermost" constitutional limits). Although courts have consistently interpreted the "transacting business"
prong of the Maryland long-arm statute as extending to the full extent permitted by due process, several courts applying Maryland law have questioned whether the "tortious injury" prongs of the statute reach the limits
of due process. See Mo ConE ANN., CTs. & Jun. PROC. §§ 6-103(b)(3), 6103(b) (4) (Supp. 2001); Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130,
136 (D. Md. 1981) (questioning whether Maryland's long-arm statute's subsections (b) (3) and (b) (4) reach the full extent permitted by due process,
but noting that federal courts have analyzed "transacting business" cases
"under the Due Process standards developed by the Supreme Court");
Craig v. Gen. Fin. Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (D. Md. 1980) (maintaining that sections 6-103(b) (3) and (b) (4) of Maryland's long-arm statute are
not "coterminous with due process"); see generally Recent Decision, The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Occasional Interstate Telephone Calls Insufficient to Sustain Personal jurisdiction try a Maryland Court, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1147,
1151 (1997) (noting federal and Maryland state courts' discord over
whether the tortious injury prongs of Maryland's long-arm statute authorize
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process). But see Stover v.
O'Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 983 (1996) (applying sections 6-103(b)(3) and (b)(4) and noting that
the Maryland long-arm statute is "coterminous with the limits of the Due
Process Clause").
72. Maryland's federal district court discussed article 23, section 92(d) in Bennett v. Computers Intercontinental, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Md.
1974), stating:

2001]

Zavian v. Foudy

15

tions to suit in Maryland on causes of action arising out of contracts
"made" 73 within this State. The modern "transaction of business" concept extended such jurisdiction considerably: 74 it applies to both individuals and corporations and promotes a certain flexibility not found
in jurisdiction based on the "making" of a contract. 75 For example,
under the present scheme, a contract negotiated or performed in
whole or in part in Maryland but "made" elsewhere may amount to a
"transaction of business" in Maryland. 76 The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland illustrated the "transaction of business" concept's flexibility in jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co. 77 by debunking the trial judge's emphasis on where the contract was "made":
The trial court also concluded that the contract was formed
in Missouri and was persuaded that this was an important
factor weighing against the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over appellee: "Well, as far as [appellee was] concerned, the
contract was negotiated in Missouri .... Well, they never left
Missouri. Everything they did was in Missouri .... " [W]e view
the conclusion of the trial judge on where the contract was
formed far from controlling in the determination of personal
jurisdiction. 78

73.

74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

Under an earlier version of the Maryland "Long Arm" Statute, the
single act of making a contract within Maryland could serve as the
basis for extraterritorial service of process. Art[icle] 23, [section]
92(d) of the 1957 edition of the Annotated Code of Maryland
reads as follows: "[E]very foreign corporation shall be subject to
suit in this State by a resident of this State or by a person having a
usual place of business in the State on any cause of action arising out
of a contract made within this State or liability incurred for acts done
within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing
or has done business in this State." ... Under the current version
of the "Long Arm" Statute [Art. 75, section 96(a)(1),] section
92(d) was incorporated into [section] 96(a)(1)-the "transaction
of business" section of the statute-and the revised section "extends such jurisdiction ... considerably."
/d. (alteration in original) (quoting, in part, Bernard Auerbach, The "Long
Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 Mo. L. REv. 13, 34 (1966)).
Maryland follows the lex loci contractus rule, under which the law of the
place where the contract was "made" governs its meaning and operation,
and a contract is considered "made" where the last act necessary for the
formation of a binding contract is performed. Baker v. Sun Co., 985 F.
Supp. 609, 611 (D. Md. 1997).
Auerbach, supra note 72, at 34.
/d.; see generally Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 256 Md. 185, 195, 260 A.2d 22,
27 (1969) (noting the "more flexible approach" of Maryland's present
long-arm statute). In the context of this article, the words "form" and
"make" are synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary defines "make" as, inter alia,
"to form" and "to execute." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 967 (7th ed. 1999).
Auerbach, supra note 72, at 34.
94 Md. App. 425, 617 A.2d 1125 (1993).
Jason Pharms., Inc., 94 Md. App. at 432-33, 617 A.2d at 1128-29 (emphasis
added) (alterations in original); see also Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Assoc., 247
Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967) (describing as "not decisive," for juris-
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Despite that clear guidance by the court of special appeals, the
Zavian trial judge exalted the importance of where the Personal Management Agreements were formed:
[W] hat is apparent to this Court is the fact that the underlying contracts at issue were not formed in Maryland, supporting a lack of jurisdiction. Although the facts surrounding
the formation of the personal representation agreements
with each of the Defendants are disputed, it is undisputed
that each of the individual players signed her respective
agreement outside Maryland, thereby forming the contract
outside Maryland .... Plaintiff offers several additional arguments in support of the proposition that there were sufficient contacts, including the argument that Plaintiff did
substantive work in Maryland for the Defendants under her
representation agreements with each. This Court, however,
does not find these contacts relevant because they do not
involve the formation of the agreements between the
parties. 79
Instead of correcting the trial court's heavy reliance on the "formation" of the retainer agreements, the Zavian court also stressed, "the
personal management agreements were neither formed, examined,
nor executed ... in Maryland."80 Although a contract's place of execution carried the day under the predecessor long-arm statute, 81 subsequentjurisprudence in Maryland and elsewhere has recognized it as
a "fortuitous circumstance" 82 undeserving of weight in a modern jurisdictional analysis applying the expansive, flexible "transaction of business standard."83
C.

New York's Distinctive ''Physical Presence" Requirement

Unlike Maryland, New York generally requires the defendant's
physical presence as a sine qua non to exercising long-arm jurisdiction;
the Nonattribution Rule exemplifies this precept, which the Supreme

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.

dictional purposes, that defendant's contracts with a Maryland entity were
"made" in California); City of New York v. Cont'l Vitamin Corp., 254 F.
Supp. 845, 848 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("The argument in defendant's brief
devoted to where the contract was 'made' is specious. Even if the contract
were 'made' outside New York, this factor would not be controlling.").
Brief for Appellant at 3, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764
(No. 00074).
Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, 702, 747 A.2d 764, 771 (2000). The redundancy
inherent in its serial use of the words "formed," "examined," and "executed" underscored the tribunal's emphasis on where the contracts were
made. !d.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that the
place of contract execution was a "purely fortuitous circumstance" and not
determinative of personal jurisdiction).
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Court has held due process does not require. New York's long-arm
statute's legislative history indicates that New York courts may subject
nonresidents to personal jurisdiction only "when they commit acts
within the state." 84 Shortly after the statute's enactment, a commentator highlighted the issues raised by New York's distinctive "physical
presence" requirement:
There is ... little doubt that if the nondomiciliary physically
comes into New York and commits certain acts there, the
New York courts will have jurisdiction over him in any action
arising out of those acts .... However, there are many cases
in which the nondomiciliary, while committing no physical
act in New York, still has some connection with that state:
perhaps he has caused a consequence to be felt there by his
actions out of state, or perhaps he has entered a contract to
be performed in New York. In these situations the construction of the statute will be crucial in determining whether the
defendant can be forced to answer the plaintiff's complaint
in New York. If the statute goes to the limits permitted by
due process, ... then in many of these borderline cases jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary will be upheld .... But if the
statute is to stop short of due process limitations, many of
these borderline defendants may escape the in personam jurisdiction of the New York courts. 85
As it turned out, in such "borderline" long-arm cases, New York's
courts adopted a conservative 86 approach aptly described as "halfWay
between Pennoyer and International Shoe': 87 although a nonresident de84. James T. Ryan, Note, New York Civil Practice and Rules Section 302, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. llO, llO (1963) (emphasis added). One commentator observed
that this limitation "would seem to exclude many situations where the defendant commits an act outside of the state with only the consequences
occurring in New York." Donald W. Large, Note, Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., Feathers v. McLucas, Singer v.
Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), 51 CoRNELL
L.Q. 377, 381 (1966).
85. Large, supra note 84, at 379. Enacted in 1963, the New York statute analyzed in that article provided:
[Section] 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of nondomiciliaries.
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary
of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he: 1. transacts any
business within the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character
arising from the act; or 3. owns, uses or possesses any real property
situated within the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1973).
86. See supra note 49.
87. Recent Decision, supra note 48, at 152. The Nonattribution Rule, which in
a suit by an agent against her nonresident principal, makes the principal's
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fendant no longer had to be physically present within New York for
service of process, the courts generally would not find that the nonresident had "transacted business" unless he had physically entered New
York to further his business objectives. 88
New York's physical presence requirement, which the Nonattribution Rule exemplifies, 89 lacks constitutional origins. According to the
Supreme Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 90 so long as a defendant's
contacts with a forum are not '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated,"'91 the mere fact that a defendant "did not physically enter the
forum State" may not defeat in personam jurisdiction in an age when
substantial amounts of business are transacted solely by non-in-person
contacts. 92 The Court's "modern commercial life"93 rationale has

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.

"physical presence" a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
exemplifies New York's conservative approach to long-arm jurisdiction. !d.
at 152.
ld. See, e.g., Emmet, Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105
(MGC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deeming services performed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction where defendant did not come to New York to request plaintiff's legal services or undertake any other purposeful activity there); Haar
v. Armendaris Carp., 294 N.E.2d at 855 (holding that services performed by a
nonresident attorney in New York, in the absence of in-state acts by the
client, are an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction in an action for legal
fees). New York's particular emphasis on physical presence also finds expression in that state's distinctive rule that a nonresident's contacts with
New York by telephone, fax, or mail generally merit little or no weight in a
jurisdictional analysis. See, e.g., Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d
757, 766 (2d Cir. 1983) ("New York courts have consistently refused to sustain section 302(a) (1) jurisdiction solely on the basis of defendant's communication from another locale with a party in New York."); Prof! Pers.
Mgmt. Corp. v. Southwest Med. Assoc., Inc., 628 N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (App.
Div. 1995) ("Interstate negotiations by telephone, facsimile or mail are insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction in New York upon a non-resident
defendant."). But see Picard v. Elbaum, 707 F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (stating that the maintenance of an investment account in New York
and telephone calls to New York ordering investment transactions were
purposeful and continuous transactions of business in New York for jurisdictional purposes); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d
506, 508 (N.Y. 1970) (stating that participation in a New York auction by
telephone conferred jurisdiction because the nonresident defendant had
"projected himself' into New York commerce). An exception to New
York's physical presence requirement is found in the portion of the Nonattribution Rule that designates a New York agent's in-state acts as attributable to a nonresident defendant-principal sued by a third party. In such
cases the nonresident may be sued in New York without ever having set foot
inside its borders. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87.
471 u.s. 462 (1985).
!d. at 475 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984)).
ld. at 476. The Burger King Court observed:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential
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only increased in cogency with the growth of interstate business transacted through Internet, electronic mail, cellular, and fax communications.94 In harmony with the Supreme Court's approach, Maryland's
courts have characterized physical presence as inessential to an exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute's "transact[ing] business" prong. 95 Maryland's and New York's divergence on the physical
presence issue makes New York long-arm case law readily distinguishable in Maryland.

D.

The Nonattribution Rule's Flawed Underpinnings

In Haar v. Armendaris Corp., the New York case that spawned the
Nonattribution Rule, the court relied on four cases that did not condefendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable
foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
"purposefully directed" toward residents of another State, we have
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.
/d. The Burger King Court approved a Florida federal court's exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction over a Michigan Burger King franchisee alleged to
have breached a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation by failing
to make required payments in Florida. /d. at 487. The Court reasoned that
the Michigan resident purposefully availed himself of the benefits of Florida law by entering into a significant, long-term franchise agreement with a
company headquartered in Florida, and by agreeing that all disputes would
be governed by Florida law. /d. at 482.
93. Id. at 476.
94. See Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal jurisdiction for the
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 411 (1998) (discussing the difficulty in applying traditional principals of jurisdiction to cyberspace-based
disputes).
95. Sleph v. Radtke, 76 Md. App. 418, 427, 545 A.2d 111, 115, cert. denied, 314
Md. 193, 550 A.2d 381 (1988) (stating that the requirements of due process
for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction are satisfied if the suit is based on a
contract that has a substantial connection with Maryland, even if the defendant has never entered the state). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has
not considered the issue of whether "transacting business" requires the defendant's "physical contacts," but in light of (1) the Supreme Court's holding that due process does not require the defendant's physical presence in
the forum; and (2) the Court of Appeals of Maryland's frequent pronouncements that the state's long-arm jurisdiction reaches to the full extent permitted by due process, it appears implausible that Maryland's
highest court would make physical presence a prerequisite to finding a
"transaction of business" in Maryland. /d. at 427-29; Snyder v. Hampton
Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141 (D. Md. 1981) ("[T]aking the Court of
Appeals [of Maryland] at its word regarding the constitutional reach of subsection (b) (1) [of the Maryland long-arm statute], this court holds that a
nonresident who has never entered the state, either personally or through
an agent, may be deemed to have 'transacted business' in the state within
the meaning of subsection (b) ( 1). ").
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cern true agency relationships; as such, those cases formed a poor
foundation for a doctrine turning on agency-based distinctions. In
addition to its shaky case law underpinnings, the Haar opinion's extreme brevity foreshadowed the conclusory approach taken in Zavian.
The Zavian court provided no exegesis for its embrace of the
Nonattribution Rule; instead, the court's conclusory holding read as
follows:
In our view, for personal jurisdiction to be exercised over a
nonresident defendant by attributing an agent's in-state activities to the nonresident defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. . . . [T] o
require the nonresident appellees to defend appellant's Maryland action based solely on appellant's professional services rendered in Maryland unilaterally by appellant would,
in our view, stretch the doctrine of International Shoe beyond
the limit of due process. 96

1.

Haar v. Armendaris Corporation

Just as the Zavian opinion failed to explain why attributing a plaintiff-agent's in-state acts to her nonresident defendant-principal offended due process and traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, Haar v. Armendaris Corporation, 97 the Nonattribution Rule's
progenitor, also lacked elucidation. Only two paragraphs long, the
Haar II decision simply reversed the appellate division's decision by
adopting Judge Capozzoli's dissent in the appellate division's opinion.98 The plaintiff, Charles Haar, who resided in Massachusetts but
held a New York attorney's license, sued in New York to recover fees
owed to him by the California-based defendant, Armendaris Corporation,99 for legal services related to the development of a residential
community in New York City. 100 Those services included negotiations
in New York City and a visit to the site of the real property in New
York. 101 In opposing Armendaris' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Haar argued that his work performed in New York
on behalf of Armendaris constituted a transaction of business in New
York by Armendaris, thereby subjecting the California company to
New York jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute/ 02 which
96.
97.
98.
99.

Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 699-700, 747 A.2d 764, 770 (2000).
294 N.E.2d 855, 855 (N.Y. 1973) [hereinafter Haar IlJ.
/d.

Haar v. Armendaris Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (Capozzoli,]., dissenting)
[hereinafter Haar 1]. The Armendaris Corporation was headquartered in
California, incorporated in Delaware, and served with process in Missouri.
/d.

100. /d. at 286.
101. /d. at 287 (Capozzoli,]., dissenting).
102. !d. at 288.
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provided, in relevant part: "As to a cause of action arising from any of
the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary ... who in person or through an
agent: 1. transacts any business within the state." 103 The Appellate Division for the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
Armedaris' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 104 but
the New York Court of Appeals reversed, 105 adopting the lower appellate court's dissenting opinion, 106 which it paraphrased as follows:
[A] s in cases, all involving agents suing their principals, in which
the Court of Appeals had denied jurisdiction, and which
were cited by it in a footnote in Parke-Bernet Galleries v.
Franklin, the present plaintiff was relying on his own activities within the State rather than on defendant's independent
activities, and that [sic] the record in the present case failed
to disclose any purposeful activity engaged in by defendant
itself within the State, out ofwhich plaintiff's action arose, so
as to render it subject to the court's jurisdiction. 107
103. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1973); see generally Whitaker v. Fresno Telsat,
Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 227, 229-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
104. Haar I, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
105. Harr II, 294 N.E.2d at 855.
106. !d.
107. !d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The actual text of the Judge
Capozzoli's dissenting opinion read as follows:
I dissent and would reverse the order appealed from which denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint herein on the ground
of lack of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff and defendant are both admittedly nondomiciliaries. On
June 15, 1971, defendant, in California, wrote to plaintiff, in Massachusetts, allegedly engaging him to "proceed to begin negotiations
with the Welfare Island Development Corporation toward the execution of a development agreement." Plaintiff, who now sues for
services rendered, based upon service on defendant in Missouri,
failed to submit an affidavit at Special Term in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. The only affidavits submitted in opposition were those of an attorney who claims to have been "engaged as
associate attorney in this matter by plaintiff' and they alleged in
conclusory fashion that he and plaintiff had negotiated in New
York City with the Welfare Island Development Corporation and
had visited the Welfare Island site here.
This is not an action between defendant and a third party, but
rather between plaintiff as agent for defendant and defendantprincipal. In the former situation I would not hesitate to find jurisdiction, but I conclude differently under the facts of this case. This
precise issue was the subject of a footnote in Parke-Bernet Galleries
v. Franklyn, which reads as follows:
2. The present case differs materially from others, relied upon
by the defendant, in which we have denied jurisdiction. (See
Glassman v. Hyder; Standard Wine & Liq. Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co.; McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp.; Kramer v.
Vogl.) It is sufficient to point out that in each of those cases,
all of which involved agents who were suing their principals,
the plaintiff was relying on his own activities within the State,
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Thus, New York's highest court established what would later be
known as the Nonattribution Rule, whereby an agent's acts in New
York are attributed to his nonresident principal whom a third party
sues, but such acts are not so attributed if the agent sues the
principal. 108
2.

Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn

In lieu of offering a rational basis to justifY this dichotomy, the Haar
II court instead merely cited to a "cryptic" 109 footnote in Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 110 which read as follows:
The present case differs materially from others, relied upon
by the defendant, in which we have denied jurisdiction. It is
sufficient to point out that in each of those cases, all of which
involved agents who were suing their principals, the plaintiff was
relying on his own activities within the State, and not those
of the defendant, as the basis for jurisdiction. In other
words, in no one of these cases had the defendant himself
engaged in purposeful activity within the State nor had the
cause of action arisen out of transactions with third parties
conducted through an agent. 111
Upon close scrutiny, the four cases cited in the Parke-Bernet footnote112 offer no insight supporting the Nonattribution Rule's agencybased dichotomy. 113 Contrary to the assertion in Parke-Bernet that
each of the four cases involved "agents who were suing their principals,"114 in actuality, none of the cases involved true agency relationships.U5 Consequently, they formed a weak foundation for a rule

108.
109.
llO.
lll.
ll2.
ll3.
ll4.
ll5.

and not those of the defendant, as the basis for jurisdiction.
In other words, in no one of these cases had the defendant
himself engaged in purposeful activity within the State nor had
the cause of action arisen out of transactions with third parties
conducted through an agent.
As in the cases in the quoted footnote, the present plaintiff is relying on his own activities within the State, rather than on defendant's independent activities. This record fails to disclose any
"purposeful activity" engaged in by defendant itself within this
State, out of which this action arose, so as to render it subject to
our jurisdiction in the plaintiff's action against it.
Haar /, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
Haar II, 294 N.E.2d at 855.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974) (noting that the "cryptic"
footnote 2 of the Parke-Bernet opinion "has always confused the writer and is
now causing consternation in the courts").
256 N.E.2d 506, 509 n.2 (N.Y. 1970).
/d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
/d.; see also supra note 107 (listing the four cases cited in Parke-Bernet).
See supra note 51.
Parke-Bernet, 256 N.E.2d at 509 n.2.
See infra notes 120-63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 2.
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turning on agency-based distinctions. What the four cases did exemplify was New York's "physical presence" rule: 116 each of the cases denied jurisdiction primarily because the defendant itself never
physically entered New York and performed a purposeful act from
which the cause of action arose.U 7 Moreover, two of the four cases
involved suits against defendants from foreign countries, 118 a scenario
that considerably raises the bar for personal jurisdiction.U 9 As the
sole ostensible support for New York's formulation of the Nonattribution Rule, each of the four cases cited in the Parke-Bernet footnote deserve careful analysis.

3.

Kramer v. Vogl

In Kramer v. Vogl, 120 the Court of Appeals of New York considered
whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a European defendant
on the theory that the plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defendant's transaction of business within NewYork. 121 Kramer, a dealer in
imported leather, received one year's exclusive American purchasing
rights for the Austrian defendant Vogl's leather goods. 122 The plaintiff earned neither a salary nor a commission from the defendant, but
simply "bought the leather and paid for it." 123 Thus, contrary to the
assertion in Parke-Bernet, 124 Kramer did not involve an agency situation
at all, but rather, a relationship between a seller and an independent
distributor of goods. 125 In alleged violation of Kramer's exclusive
purchasing rights, Vogl sold its wares to other American leather dealers, and Kramer sued for willful fraud and deceit. 126 According to the
Kramer court,
The issue boils down to whether the phrase "transacts any
business within the state" covers the situation of a nonresident who never comes into New York State but who sells and
116. See infra notes 120-63 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 137-80 and accompanying text.
118. SeeKramerv. Vogl, 215 N.E.2d 159,160 (N.Y. 1966). See infra notes 121-28
and accompanying text for a discussion of Kramer. See Standard Wine &
Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 228 N.E.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. 1967). See
infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of Standard Wine.
119. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987)
(cautioning that "the Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations
policies" requires "[g]reat care and reserve" when extending personal jurisdiction over defendants from outside the United States).
120. 215 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1966).
121. !d. at 160.
122. !d.
123. !d. at 161.
124. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
125. Kramer, 215 N.E.2d at 161.
126. !d. at 160.
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sends goods into the State pursuant to an order sent from
within the State. 127
In declining to exercise jurisdiction over the Austrian defendant,
the Kramer court observed that Vogl: 1) conducted no sales, promotion, or advertising activities in New York; 2) generated only 1% to 2%
of its total sales from the plaintiff; and 3) offered no evidence that the
leather it sold to the plaintiff was resold or used in New York. 128

4.

Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co.

On facts very similar to those in Kramer v. Vogl, 129 New York's state
supreme court also denied jurisdiction in Standard Wine & Liquor Co.
v. Bombay Spirits Co. 130 In that case, Penrose, a liquor importer and
distributor, acquired the United States distribution rights to the Scottish defendant's Bombay liquor products. 131 Penrose and Bombay
then granted the plaintiff, Standard Wine, a liquor distributor, exclusive New York metropolitan area rights for five years to distribute and
sell Bombay brand gin and vermouth. 132 Subsequendy, in alleged violation of those exclusive rights, Penrose and Bombay granted distribution rights to other New York metropolitan area liquor dealers, and
Standard Wine then sued the Scottish defendant for breach of contract.133 The New York court noted, "Penrose dealt independently of
Bombay and was not the latter's agent." 134 Likewise, it may be reasonably inferred that Standard Wine also dealt "independendy" of Bombay and was not its agent. Thus, contrary to the assertion in ParkeBernet, 135 Standard Wine did not involve an agency situation at all, but
rather, as in Kramer, a relationship between a seller and an independent distributor of goods. 136 In declining to exercise jurisdiction over
the Scottish distiller, the Standard Wine court observed that, as in
Kramer, 137 the foreign defendant conducted no in-state "sales, promotion or advertising." 138 This scenario stands in "sharp contrast" 139 to
cases sustaining jurisdiction, in which "the foreign corporations sent
substantial quantities of goods into New York in response to orders
127. !d. at 161 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 161-62.
129. In each case, the plaintiff sold the products of a non-American defendant,
the defendant had no physical presence in New York, and the parties
shared no agency relationship. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
130. 228 N.E.2d 367 (N.Y. 1967).
131. !d. at 368.
132. !d.
133. !d.
134. !d. at 369 (emphasis added).
135. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
136. See Standard Wine, 228 N.E.2d at 368.
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138. Standard Wine, 228 N.E.2d at 369.
139. !d.
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which they had solicited through catalogues and widespread advertising [in New York] ." 140

5.

McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp.

In McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 141 the Court of Appeals of
New York again considered whether to exercise jurisdiction over a
nondomiciliary on the theory that the plaintiff's cause of action arose
from the defendant's transaction of business within New York. 142 The
New York-based plaintiff, McKee, a dealer in audio equipment, was
granted non-exclusive rights to distribute the Chicago-based defendant Rauland-Borg's sound equipment products. 143 Subsequently, a
disagreement arose between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's customers, and Rauland-Borg sent its representative to New York to look into
the difficulties. 144 Thereafter, Rauland-Borg terminated McKee's distributorship, and McKee sued for breach of contract. 145 The McKee
Electric court observed that McKee was one of "a number of distributors, all of whom are independent businessmen selling the sound equipment of other manufacturers as well as thar of Rauland-Borg." 146
Thus, contrary to the assertion in Parke-Bernet, 147 McKee Electric did not
involve an agency situation at all, but rather, a relationship between a
seller and an independent distributor of goods. 148 In refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Illinois defendant, the McKee Electric court
characterized Rauland-Borg's New York contacts as so "infinitesimal"149 that personal jurisdiction could not be sustained. 150 The
court held that if jurisdiction was exercised under the instant facts,
then "every corporation whose officers or sales personnel happen to
pass the time of day with a New York customer in New York runs the
risk of being subjected to the personal jurisdiction of [New York's)
courts." 151

140. !d. (contrasting the instant factual scenario with that of Singer v. Walker, 298
N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1973) where an allegedly improperly manufactured geologist's hammer caused the loss of an eye).
141. 229 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1967).
142. Id. at 605.
143. ld.
144. Id. at 606.
145. Id.
146. ld. at 605 (emphasis added).
147. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
148. McKee Electric, 229 N.E.2d at 605.
149. ld. at 607.
150. Id.
151. ld.
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Glassman v. Hyder

In Glassman v. Hyder/ 52 a New York-licensed real estate salesman,
Charles Glassman, entered into a broker agreement with three New
Mexico residents who wanted to sell a building they owned in New
Mexico. 153 Mr. Glassman alleged that, after he found a suitable buyer
whose offer the New Mexico owners agreed to accept, the owners refused to sign a written contract and failed to pay the agreed commissions.154 The salesman sued to collect his commission; however, the
New York court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction,
noting that the broker contract, which was never even reduced to writing, "was brought about through the initiative of the broker, who telephoned New Mexico and proffered his services" 155 to the property
owners. 156 The property owners "were at no time physically present in
New York." 157 Under the circumstances, and citing A. Millner Co. v.
Noudar, LDA., 158 the Glassman court held, "[t]he acts of the indepen152. 244 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1968). The Glassman case was decided under section
404 of the New York City Civil Court Act. See Sparks & Co. v. Gallos, 220
A.2d 673, 674 (NJ. 1966) (noting that, apart from its territorial restrictions,
section 404 of the New York City Civil Court Act "is identical with New York
State's 'long arm' statute").
153. Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 260.
154. ld.
155. Id. at 260, 263 (emphasis added).
156. ld. at 260 (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App. Div. 1966). In Millner, the Portuguese defendant
had granted the New York plaintiff exclusive rights to market its olives and
other food products in the United States and Canada. Id. at 292. Under
the contract, the plaintiff received a three percent commission on all orders it obtained for the defendant. Id. Mter four years, the defendant cancelled the contract, and the plaintiff sued for breach. Id. at 291-92. In
declining to exercise long-arm jurisdiction, the Millner court stated:
The question presented is whether the defendant transacted some
business in New York with respect to the contract out of which this
action arises. If the plaintiff were an employee of or an agent acting exclusively for the defendant, plaintiff's acts, in and of themselves, performed for the defendant in New York would suffice to
establish jurisdiction of the action against the defendant. But it is
asserted and not denied that the plaintiff is an independent broker
representing many different companies on a commission basis, in
no way under the defendant's control. In such circumstances the
acts of the broker representative, the plaintiff herein, are not the
acts of the so-called principal, and do not create a basis for jurisdiction against this defendant.
Id. at 292-93 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Millner case thus
established what one commentator dubbed New York's "exclusive agent"
rule, whereby if the plaintiff serves as the nonresident defendant's exclusive
agent in New York, the nonresident is deemed to have transacted business
in New York, but if the plaintiff represents several companies on a commission basis, the court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the one company the. broker representative is suing solely on the grounds of the "socalled" agency relationship. Recent Decision, supra note 48, at 155 n.38.
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dent broker within New York should not ... be attributed to the owners so as to become acts of the owners in NewYork." 159 Thus, contrary
to Parke-Bernet's assertion that Glassman involved an agent suing his
principal, 160 the Glassman court viewed the real estate broker as an
"independent" party and therefore undeserving of having his in-state
activities imputed to the New Mexico defendants for jurisdictional
purposes. 161 In Proctor v. Holden, 162 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland offered persuasive reasoning that supports the Glassman
court's characterization of the realtor as an independent party, and
not a true agent:
One may doubt the realism or good sense of applying traditional agency law to real estate brokerage. The broker's social and economic purpose is as an intermediary, bringing
seller and buyer together and perhaps making both give a
little bit in the process, for their own good. He has a sense of
obligation to both, if he is conscientious, yet he really is a
self-dealer, seeking monetary reward for fulfilling his useful
social and economic role. 163

IV.

A.

CRITICISM OF ZAVIAN v. FOVDY

Distinguishing Zavian from Haar

Haar v. Armendaris164 presented a far weaker case for personal jurisdiction than did Zavian v. Foudy 165 because in Haar, both parties were
nonresidents, 166 a scenario not invoking the forum's "rightful interest
and legitimate power" to provide a venue for the redress of wrongs to
its citizens. One may distinguish the facts in Haar from those in
Zavian because in Zavian, the plaintiff was a domiciliary of the forum
state. 167 Although the Zavian court overlooked this important distinction, the United States Supreme Court/ 68 the Fourth Circuit Court of
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 263 (emphasis added).
See supra notes llO-ll and accompanying text.
Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 263.
75 Md. App. 1, 540 A.2d 133 (1988).
Id. at 17, 540 A.2d at 141 (quoting W.B. Raushenbush, Problems and Practices
with Financing Conditions in Real Estate Purchase Contracts, 1963 Wrs. L. REv.
566, 594 (1963)).
337 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1972), rev'd, 294 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1973) (reversing the Appellate Division's decision based on the dissent in the Appellate Division's opinion).
130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000).
Haar I, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting).
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
(holding that the plaintiff's nonresidency diminished California's interest
in exercising long-arm jurisdiction); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 4 71
U.S. 462, 473 (1985) ("A State generally has a 'manifest interest' in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by
out-of-state actors.").
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Appeals/ 69 and New Yorkjurists 170 have emphasized the significance
of the plaintiff's forum residency vel non. A plaintiff's residency in the
forum weighs in favor of jurisdiction because it invokes that state's
manifest and legitimate interest to ensure the economic health of its
citizens by providing them with a convenient forum to redress wrongs
inflicted by out-of-state actors. 171 Conversely, a plaintiff's nonresidency fails to invoke such interests and therefore diminishes the
state's rightful interest in exercising long-armjurisdiction. 172 In Haar,
the plaintiff's nondomiciliary status failed to implicate the state's interest in providing its residents a forum in which to sue, 173 but in
Zavian, the plaintiff's Maryland citizenship did implicate that interest. 174 Unlike other courts, 175 the Zavian court neglected to recognize
that this important distinction weighed in favor of its exercising jurisdiction and rendered Haar an inapt precedent. 176

B.

Mischaracterizing Legal Services as "Unilateral Activity"

The Zavian court misapplied Supreme Court and Maryland precedent by dismissing the Maryland attorney's services as unilateral activity
despite the clearly bilateral nature of the parties' attorney-client relationship, and by disregarding the defendants' purposeful and repeated business-related appearances in Maryland.
In Hanson v. Denckla, 177 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's
"unilateral activity" 178 cannot satisfY due process; 179 rather, the "mini169. Ellicott Mach. Corp. v.John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir.
1993). Applying Maryland law, the court held that "Maryland, of course,
has an interest in adjudicating the action insofar as it seeks to ensure the
economic health of its citizens and the fair resolution of their disputes." /d.
170. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Carroll, 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (N.Y. 1997) (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting) ("New York has its own rightful interest and legitimate power
to protect and to provide judicial access here for the redress of wrongs to its
residents and citizens.").
171. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
172. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 114 (noting that plaintiffs nonresidency diminished California's interest in exercising long-armjurisdiction).
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
175. See Savitz v. Zim Chern. Co., 364 N.Y.S.2d 661,664 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (exercising long-arm jurisdiction and distinguishing "the facts set forth in Haar v.
Armendaris Corp ... from the facts in the instant case in that in Haar the
parties were both nondomiciliaries of the State of New York"); Carro,
Spanbock, Kaster, & Cuiffo v. Rinzler, No. 88 Civ. 5280 (MJL), 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1212, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (exercising long-arm jurisdiction
and rejecting the defendants' reliance on Harr as "misplaced" because, unlike the instant case, in Haar the parties were both nondomiciliaries of New
York).
176. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
177. 357 u.s. 235 (1958).
178. /d. at 253.
179. /d.
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mal contacts" 180 required by due process are not met unless the nonresident defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 181 Applying that standard, the Hanson
Court invalidated Florida's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
Delaware trust company because the only connections between the
nonresident defendant and the State of Florida were those initiated by
and for the benefit of the plaintiff. 182 In other words, the Delaware
company had committed no volitional act bearing a connection to the
forum or a resident of the forum; thus, the only contacts with the
forum were those created by the settlor's unilateral decision to relocate to Florida and exercise her power of appointment there. 183 Hanson distinguished McGee v. International Life Insurance, Co., 184 where the
nonresident defendant had, for its own benefit, initiated connections
180. !d. at 251.
181. !d. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
182. !d. at 252. The Court of Appeals of Maryland skillfully summarized Hanson's convoluted facts in Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818
( 1976), stating:
The cause of action in Hanson arose out of a trust settled in Delaware and concerned the effectiveness of the exercise of a power of
appointment in Florida. At the time of execution of the deed of
trust in Delaware, the settlor was a Pennsylvania domiciliary and
the trustee was a Delaware bank. Subsequently the settlor moved
to Florida where she attempted to exercise the power of appointment in question. After the death of the settlor, a Florida court, in
a proceeding in which the Delaware trustee did not appear, held
that the trust, and therefore the power of appointment, was invalid
under Florida law. When a Delaware court refused to give full faith
and credit to the Florida court's decree, the jurisdiction of the Florida court over the Delaware trust company became the issue.
The Court held that the contacts of the Delaware trust company
with Florida were insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the Florida courts. The trust company was neither present,
nor did it transact any business in Florida. Moreover, this was not a
case, said the Court, like McGee where the cause of action arose out
of a transaction having a substantial connection with the forum.
The cause of action in Hanson, according to the Court, arose out of
the Delaware trust agreement, which, when entered into, had no
connection with the Florida forum. It was only years later that
there arose any connection between the trust agreement and the
State of Florida, after the settlor moved there and initiated several
"bits" of trust administration from Florida while receiving periodic
payments from the trust company of trust income; it was also in
Florida, of course, that the settlor executed the power of appointment in question. These connections between the trust agreement, the transaction out of which the cause of action arose, and
the forum, because of their nature and quality, were found to lack
the substantiality necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction over the
Delaware trust company.
!d. at 228-29, 352 A.2d at 823-24.
183. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
184. 355 u.s. 220 (1957).
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with the forum by soliciting an insurance contract with a California
resident. 185 The Supreme Court thus drew a distinction whereby a
plaintiffs initiation of forum contacts weighs against an exercise of jurisdiction, but a defendant's initiation of forum contacts by, for example, initiating a contractual relationship with a forum resident, weighs
in favor of jurisdiction. 186 The "purposeful availment" requirement
established in Hanson became an integral part of the minimum contacts analysis.
In Zavian, the court mischaracterized the Maryland attorney's legal
services when it termed them, "as the Supreme Court [in Hanson] put
it, 'unilateral activity."' 187 To the contrary, the soccer players, to further their own business aims, initiated contact with the Maryland lawyer when each "individually contacted" 188 Ms. Zavian and "proposed
that she act as their agent," 189 thereby inaugurating bilateral contractual ties that would obligate them to send payment into Maryland for
services to be performed in Maryland by a Maryland resident. 190 The
Zavian court justified its characterization of the lawyer's services as
"unilateral activity" by asserting, "[a]lthough the appellees contacted
appellant to obtain her professional services, it was because her name
appeared on a list of lawyers willing to perform such services for female athletes and not because she was a Maryland lawyer." 191 In giving the defendants' purposeful initiation of the business relationship
little weight, 192 the Zavian court failed to view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, 193 and ignored an important
185. /d. at 221. In McGee, the Supreme Court ruled that a nonresident's single
act of soliciting an insurance contract with a resident of the forum state was
enough to confer jurisdiction because of the forum's interest in providing
effective redress for its resident when a nonresident refuses to pay pursuant
to a contractual relationship initiated by the nonresident. /d. at 223. In
reviewing developments since Pennayer, the McGee Court noted:
[A] trend is clearly discernable toward expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve
parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity.
/d. at 222-23.
186. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252.
187. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 700, 747 A.2d at 770-71 (emphasis added).
188. /d. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766.
189. /d.
190. /d. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766.
191. /d. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771.
192. /d. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771.
193. Zavian was a groundbreaking case not only for its adoption of the Nonattribution Rule, but also because, for the first time, a Maryland state appel-
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advisement from the court of appeals: "The Hanson principle does not
mandate an inquiry into motive; it is sufficient that, for whatever reason,
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum." 194
The Zavian court also gave little weight to the defendant soccer
players' repeated appearances in Maryland to "'personally conduct
business, perform, play, train, conduct meetings, and attend promotional appearances.">I 95 Of these contacts, the court said: "Unfortunately for appellant, appellees' only contacts with Maryland are
because they are members of the [United States Women's Soccer]
Team .... In other words, the appellees appear wherever the Team's
schedule takes them, be it Maryland or Timbuktu." 196 Once again,
the Zavian court failed to heed Geelhoed's mandate that a nonresident's purposeful activities in Maryland, conducted ''for whatever reason," merit due consideration in a jurisdictional analysis. 197 Under
Geelhoed's interpretation of Hanson, it is irrelevant that the soccer players' repeated appearances to conduct purposeful activities in Maryland were required by their status as Team members. 198 On facts
analogous to those in Zavian, in Geelhoed the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheldjurisdiction after rejecting the defendant's assertion that
his temporary "presence in Maryland was not voluntary because he
was required to work in the State by the Public Health Service in connection with his Selective Service obligation." 199
late court held that a court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction must consider the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771-72.
Specifically, the Zavian opinion stated:
Lastly, appellant contends it was reversible error for the trial court
to grant appellees' Motion to Dismiss without considering evidence
in the light most favorable to appellant. It was error for the trial court
to say there were "simply too many disputed facts surrounding this
matter to support a finding of jurisdiction given that the supporting affidavits are atodds," but it was harmless error. Had the trial
court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to appellant, the
result would have been the same.
/d. (emphasis added). Cf Mun. Mortgage & Equity, LLC v. Southfork
Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 93 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting
Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)) ("In considering a
challenge to personal jurisdiction, 'the court must construe all relevant
pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume
credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of
jurisdiction.'").
194. Geelhoed v.Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 231, 352 A.2d 818, 825 (1976) (emphasis
added).
195. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771.
196. /d.
197. Geelhoed, 277 Md. at 231, 352 A.2d at 825.
198. See id.
199. /d. at 230-31, 352 A.2d at 824-25.
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Initiation of the Attorney-Client Relationship

The Zavian court should have assigned weight in its jurisdictional
analysis to the nonresident defendants' initiation of the parties' attorney-client relationship. In assessing the sufficiency of a nonresident's
contacts with the forum state, the "constitutional touchstone" 200 is
whether the contacts were "purposefully established" 201 by the defendant such that he "will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result
of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." 202 Amplifying on Hanson's "purposeful availment" doctrine, 203 the Supreme Court in Burger
King articulated a dichotomy whereby contacts with the forum state
that are "purposefully established" 204 by the defendant weigh in favor
of jurisdiction, but those that are '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated'" do not. 205 Although the Zavian court failed to cite Burger
King, 206 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland implicitly (and incorrectly) found that the "constitutional touchstone" 207 of purposeful
contact with the forum state was not met. 208 Despite acknowledging
that the defendant soccer players initiated the business relationship
with their Maryland attorney, 209 the Zavian opinion incongruously asserted that the defendant soccer players "did not purposely seek a Maryland agent" 210 and "did not purposely engage in adequate activities in
Maryland." 211 To the contrary, what acts of a defendant could be
more "purposeful" than the soccer players' selecting, soliciting, and
retaining Ms. Zavian, a Maryland attorney, to represent them in substantial business transactions? 212 A nonresident's purposeful, deliberate, and voluntary creation of a significant interstate attorney-client
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
!d.
Id. at 475 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
Burger King, 357 U.S. at 474.
ld. at 475 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of Burger King.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771.
ld. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771.
Id. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771 (emphasis added).
!d. (emphasis added).
See Cramer v. Lupka, No. D.N. CV91 0120228 S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS
878, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1992) (noting that the nonresident's
hiring of a Connecticut attorney to perform legal services in Connecticut
"constitutes a single purposeful business transaction sufficient to impose
jurisdiction under our Long Arm Statute"); Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d
988, 997 (D.C. 1981) (noting that hiring an attorney, "far from being fortuitous or accidental," created a contact with the attorney's forum that was
"deliberate and voluntary"); see generally Nueva Eng'g, Inc. v. Accurate Elec.,
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 953, 954-55 (D. Md. 1986) ("Entering into a contract is
always 'purposeful' in some way, and commercial transactions with a forum
plaintiff always implicate the benefits and protections of the forum's laws to
some extent.").
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relationship may readily be distinguished from factual scenarios properly characterized as '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated. "' 213 Examples of cases falling within the latter category include World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 214 Kulko v. California Superior Court, 215 and
Hanson v. Denckla. 216 In each of those cases, the nonresident defendant did not participate in the act establishing contacts with the forum; rather, the unilateral and fortuitous act of the plaintiff created the
forum contacts. 217 On the other hand, establishing an interstate attorney-client relationship, such as present in Zavian, 218 inherently requires the bilateral and purposeful assent of both the attorney and the
nonresident client. When the nonresident initiates the relationship,
as in Zavian, 219 the case for extraterritorial jurisdiction grows even
stronger. 220
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland elevated the initiation factor in Potomac Design, Inc. v. Eurocal Trading,
Inc., 221 observing that "a determination of whether the defendant initiated the business relationship in some way" has been viewed as the
"strongest factor" or even a "dispositive" factor when deciding the propriety of exercising long-arm jurisdiction. 222 As in Maryland, courts in
New York223 and elsewhere 224 have recognized the materiality of who
213. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
214. 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that due process forbids the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state automobile distributor whose only tie
to the forum resulted from a customer's decision to drive there).
215. 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (holding that due process forbids exercising personal
jurisdiction over a divorced husband sued for child-support payments
whose only affiliation with the forum was created by his former spouse's
decision to live there).
216. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that due process forbids exercisingjurisdiction over a trustee whose only connection with the forum resulted from the
settlor's decision to exercise her power of appointment there).
217. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
218. 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766.
219. /d.
220. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
221. 839 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1993).
222. /d. at 370. The Potomac Design court observed:
"[T]he courts have considered various factors in the contract situation, including whether the parties contemplated that the work
would be performed, where payment was made, etc. The strongest
factor that seems to have emerged, however, is a determination of
whether the defendant initiated the business relationship in some
way .... The Fourth Circuit also seems to have adopted the determination of whether the defendant initiated the business relationship in some way as a dispositive factor .... "
/d. (alterations in original) (quoting NuevaEng'g, Inc., 628 F. Supp. at 955).
223. See Williams v. Nathan, 897 F. Supp. 72, 76 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that
the fact that plaintiff initiated contacts with defendant "weighs against a
finding that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant") citing
Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. W. Oil & Refining Co., 708 F. Supp. 86, 88-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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initiated the business relationship. Although the Zavian court acknowledged that the soccer players initiated their attorney-client relationship with Ms. Zavian, 225 the court of special appeals went against
the weight of authority in according that fact no weight in its jurisdictional analysis.
D.

Analyzing Asahi 's Reasonableness Factors

The Zavian court failed to consider any of the five "reasonableness"
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court of California; if it had, it would have found that each of the
four relevant factors weighed in favor of Maryland's exercise of jurisdiction. In Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court of California, 226 the
Supreme Court set forth five factors that a court "must consider" 227 to
determine the "reasonableness" 228 of the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction: 1) "the burden on the defendant;" 2) "the interests of the
forum State;" 3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief;" 4) "'the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;"' and 5) "'the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' "229 The
Zavian court considered none of these factors. 230 If it had, it would
have found that four of the factors weighed in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident soccer players, and that the fifth factor
was inapplicable. First, whereas the Zavian defendants' vocation required frequent interstate travel to locations including Maryland, 231
and two of the three defendants resided in relatively nearby eastern
seaboard states, 232 the burden on them to defend a suit in Maryland
would have been relatively slight. Second, Maryland had a strong interest in providing Ms. Zavian, a Maryland citizen, a forum to enforce
her contractual rights, which, according to the Personal Management
224. See, e.g., Ideal Ins. Agency v. Shipyard Marine, Inc., 572 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) ("The initiation of a transaction is an important factor in
determining whether a defendant transacted business in lthe] State.").
225. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771.
226. 480 u.s. 102 (1987).
227. !d. at 113.
228. !d. If the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is "reasonable" under the
Asahi factors, it will not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' !d. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
229. !d. at 113 (citations omitted); see also infra note 236.
230. See generally Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, '747 A.2d 764.
231. !d. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771.
232. Julie Foudy, Carla Overbeck, and Kristine Lilly resided in California, North
Carolina, and Connecticut, respectively. !d. at 691-92, 747 A.2d at 766.
Compare Nueva Eng'g, Inc. v. Accurate Elec., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D.
Md. 1986) (taking 'judicial notice of the fact that Connecticut and Maryland are not very far apart in the modem world") with Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114
(the "unique burdens" on the Japanese defendant would have been "severe" because of the great distance between Japan and California, and the
disadvantages of litigating in a foreign country's judicial system).

2001]

Zavian v. Foudy

35

Agreements, were to be enforced according to the laws of Maryland.233 The Zavian opinion failed to mention this important fact. 234
Third, Ms. Zavian had a strong interest in avoiding the inconvenience
of litigating her common-issue claims in three different states. 235
Fourth, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies should have weighed heavily in
favor of Maryland's exercising jurisdiction over the common issues instead of separately adjudicating the same issues three times over in the
courts of California, Connecticut, and North Carolina. 236
E.

The Zavian Court's Refusal to Acknowledge Precedents from Fourteen
Other jurisdictions

The Zavian opinion's survey of on-point cases painted an incomplete picture because it neglected to cite any of the court decisions
from fourteen jurisdictions exercising judicial authority over a nonresident client sued by their attorney for unpaid legal fees.
In support of its adoption of the Nonattribution Rule, 237 the Zavian
court cited cases from only two states, New York and Illinois. 238 Both
states belong to the small minority of seven states that interpret their
long-arm statutes as not extending personal jurisdiction to the full extent constitutionally permissible. 239 Further, Zavian acknowledged
only one case supporting the contrary position, i.e., supporting attribution, for jurisdictional purposes, of a plaintiff-agent's in-state acts to
233. Brief for Appellant at 2, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764
(2000) (No. 00074).
234. See generally Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764. Cf Asahi, 480 U.S. at
114 (stating that California's interest in exercisingjurisdiction was "slight"
because both parties were nonresidents, and because it was doubtful that
California law would govern the dispute); Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 482
("Nothing in our cases ... suggests that a choice-of-law provision should be
ignored in considering whether a defendant has 'purposefully invoked the
benefits and protections of a State's laws' for jurisdictional purposes.").
235. Cf Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (stating that it was no more convenient for the
Japanese plaintiff to litigate in California than in Taiwan or Japan).
236. Asahi's fifth "reasonableness" factor, "the advancement of substantive policies," was not implicated by the Zavian facts. !d. at 115 (stating that the
Supreme Court cautioned that "the Federal Government's interest in its
foreign relations policies" requires "[g]reat care and reserve" when extending personal jurisdiction over alien defendants).
237. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Emmet, Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105
(MGC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deeming services performed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction where defendant did not come to New York to request plaintiff's legal services or undertake any other purposeful activity there);Jacobson v. Stram, No. 80 C 1228, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15437, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 29, 1980) ("An attorney's mere performance of professional services in
Illinois on behalf of an out-of-state client is not sufficient to subject the
foreign party to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois.").
239. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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a nonresident defendant-principal. 240 Unfortunately, the Zavian
court's survey of on-point cases painted an incomplete picture of the
relevant jurisprudence. 241 In fact, precedents in fourteen jurisdictions have upheld the forum's exercise of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction when an in-state lawyer sues a nonresident client to collect a
fee. 242 On the other hand, until Zavian, only courts in the non-full240. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 698-99, 747 A.2d at 769-70. The Zavian opinion
cited Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (D. Md.
1981), discussed supra in notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
241. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 696-98, 747 A.2d at 768-69.
242. See Fly, Shuebruk, Gaguine, Boros & Braun v. Marcus, No. 94 Civ. 543
(KTD), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1996) (holding
that New York's long-arm statute was satisfied where New York law firm's
contract to provide legal services to the nonresident defendant "was entered into and largely performed in New York and ... the defendant repeatedly met with the plaintiff in New York"); Robins, Kaplan, Miller &
Ciresi v. Senoret Chern. Co., No. 4-90-317, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19852, at
*2, *8 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that Missouri defendant, which
retained Minnesota law firm to perform legal services, was subject to Minnesota's personal jurisdiction in suit for unpaid fees); Schwartz & Assocs. v.
Elite Line, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that in a
suit by a Missouri attorney to recover legal fees owed by California defendants, Missouri's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction comported with due process because "[d]efendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits
of the forum by initiating contact" with plaintiff); Jenner & Block v. Land
Paving Co., No. 85 C 07552, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28769, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 1986) (holding that in an action for payment of attorney fees owed
to an Illinois law firm, the Illinois long-arm statute and due process were
satisfied because the Nebraska defendant "knew or should have known that
the Illinois plaintiff would perform its contractual obligations in Illinois
and could reasonably foresee that its conduct and connection with Illinois
was such that they could anticipate being brought into court in Illinois");
Law Offices ofjerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast Sys., Ltd., 630 F. Supp. 1311,
1313 (D.D.C. 1986) (exercising long-arm jurisdiction over New York residents who retained District of Columbia lawyers and noting that "many
courts, including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, have found
that defendants who sought legal counsel within a forum may be subject to
personal jurisdiction in that forum for failure to pay legal fees");
O'Connor, Cavanaugh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A.
v. Bonus Utah, Inc., 750 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that plaintiff, a Utah corporation, subjected itself to Arizona's long-arm jurisdiction by contracting with an Arizona attorney for legal services to be
performed in Arizona); Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease v. Ryan, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 859 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a California resident who had
"hired an Ohio law firm to do legal work in Ohio" had committed to a
"contract for legal services [that] was sufficiently connected with Ohio so
that Ohio's exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable"); Cramer v.
Lupka, No. DN CV91 0120228S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 878, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1992) (holding that a nonresident's hiring of a
Connecticut attorney to perform legal services in Connecticut "constitutes a
single purposeful business transaction sufficient to impose jurisdiction
under our Long Arm Statute"); Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 997
(D.C. 1981) (noting that Florida appellees who solicited District of Columbia attorney to perform work primarily in the District "transacted business"
within the meaning of the long-arm statute: "[F]ar from being fortuitous or
accidental, appellees' contacts were deliberate and voluntary as evidenced
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extent243 states of New York and Illinois had denied jurisdiction under
such facts. 244
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the court of special appeals' decision in Zavian v.
Foudy, 245 a practitioner may ask: are federal courts applying Maryland
law bound to apply the Nonattribution Rule, 246 do they remain free to
reject it, as the district court did in Snyder, 247 or does the real answer
lie somewhere in between? The Zavian court made its view clear:
"Federal district courts ... are bound by the decisions of the Maryland
Courts of Appeal interpreting Maryland law." 248 However, in Craig v.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

by the communications between appellees and appellant in the District,
which appellees had initiated in the first instance"); Bordelon, Hamlin,
Theriot & Hardy v. Burlington Broad., Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (upholding long-arm jurisdiction over an Iowa defendant sued
for legal fees despite the fact that he "never physically entered Louisiana;"
factors weighing in favor of personal jurisdiction included defendant's initiation of contact with the plaintiff, the fact that the engagement letter was
drafted in Louisiana, and "numerous telephone calls, facsimiles and mailings to and from Louisiana" during the six months oflegal representation);
Phillips v. Rhode Island, No. 94-5112-G, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 460, at *9
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1995) (holding that a Rhode Island defendant,
sued by a Massachusetts law firm for unpaid fees, was subject to Massachusetts' long-arm jurisdiction because it "affirmatively sought out counsel in
Massachusetts and entered into a contract with a Massachusetts partnership" with whom it "then remained in continual telephonic and written
contact ... for over three years"); Alan B. McPheron, Inc. v. Koning, 336
N.W.2d 474,477,478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding enforcement of an
Oklahoma judgment against a Michigan resident, rendered pursuant to
Oklahoma's long-arm statute, because "defendant made the initial contact
seeking legal services to be rendered in Oklahoma"); Wilson & Reitman v.
Berick, No. 59884, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 474, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6,
1992) (upholding enforcement of a California judgment against an Ohio
resident, rendered pursuant to California's exercise of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction, because the Ohio resident had "availed himself of the
privileges of conducting business in the state of California" by hiring a California Jaw firm to provide legal services in California for his son); O'Brien
v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. 1966) (holding that an Illinois
judgment secured by an Illinois attorney through long-arm jurisdiction
over a Texas client was enforceable in Texas); Toulouse v. Swanson, 438
P.2d 578, 580 (Wash. 1968) (holding that in a suit for unpaid legal fees,
propriety of Washington's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over Idaho resident was "undebatable" because "[i]t is beyond dispute that defendant consummated a transaction in this state when he employed plaintiff as his
lawyer").
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 238.
130 Md. App. 689, 702, 747 A.2d 764, 771 (2000).
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (D. Md. 1981); see
also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 698 n.2, 747 A.2d at 769 n.2 (emphasis added).

38

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

General Finance Corp., 249 the United States District Court for the District of Maryland mentioned only Maryland's highest court, when it
stated that "[t]his court is bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland as to whether a particular subsection [of the longarm statute] will reach certain conduct." 250 The Supreme Court
struck a middle ground in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of
Bosch, 251 advising:

[W] hile the decrees of "lower state courts" should be "attributed some weight ... the decision [is] not controlling ... "
where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the
point. [Moreover,] "an intermediate appellate state court
... is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise. " 252
Given the conflicting decisions of Maryland's federal district
court253 and the State's intermediate appellate court, 254 the Court of
Appeals ofMaryland may, if presented with the opportunity, choose to
reassess whether the Nonattribution Rule 255 accords with Maryland's
historical commitment to extend its long-arm jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by due process. 256 Until then, Maryland's bench
and bar will harbor uncertainty as to which applies in federal court:
the Snyder court's 257 rejection of the Nonattribution Rule, 258 or the
Zavian court's 259 adoption of it.
Personal jurisdiction controversies evoke the wisdom expressed by
Supreme CourtJustice Oliver Wendell Holmesjr.: 260 "I long have said
there is no such thing as a hard case. I am frightened weekly, but
always when you walk up to the lion and lay hold the hide comes off
and the same old donkey of a question of law is undemeath." 261 In
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

261.

504 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1980).
Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
387 u.s. 456 (1967).
Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 141-42 (rejecting the Nonattribution Rule).
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770 (embracing the Nonattribution Rule).
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 141-42.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., known as "The Great Dissenter," served
with distinction on the United States Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932.
SeeTHE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR. 3 (Robert W. Gardner ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1992).
Young v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Md. App. 233, 235, 671 A.2d 515,
516 (1996) (quoting 1 HoLMEs-PoLLOCK LETrERS: THE CoRREsPONDENCE OF
MR. JusTICE HoLMES AND SIR FREDERICK PoLLOCK 1874-1932, 156 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., Rothman & Co. 1994)).

2001]

Zavian v. Foudy

39

cases like Zavian, the "old donkey" concerns whether a nonresident's
Maryland contacts justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under Maryland's long-arm statute and the analytical roadmap of International Shorl- 62 and its progeny. In such cases, Maryland's interest
in providing its citizens a convenient forum to redress wrongs inflicted
by nonresidents 263 should prevail over those using due process as a
stalking horse to avoid their voluntarily assumed interstate
obligations. 264

262. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
264. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).

